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Combining longitudinal field research and executive experience, we propose that corporate longevity depends on matching cycles of autonomous and induced strategy processes to different forms of strategic dynamics, and that the role of alert strategic leadership is to appropriately balance the induced and autonomous processes throughout these cycles. We also propose that such strategic leadership is the means through which leadership style exerts its influence on corporate longevity. Our findings can be related to organizational research on structural inertia, learning and adaptation, as well as to formal theories of complex adaptive systems. They also contribute to resolving the seeming contradiction between a study of corporations that attributes exceptional long-term success to leadership style, and the more common proposition that strategy is the determinant of long-term performance.
INTRODUCTION
It is generally acknowledged that relatively few companies survive as independent entities for very long periods of time. For instance, of the top100 US-based industrial companies listed in Fortune magazine in 1965 only 19 remain in the top 100 in 2005, 15 fell out of the top 100, and 66 were acquired or disbanded. 1 We think that an important reason for this lack of institutional longevity is that most of the time companies operate in a stable industry structure and develop a strategy-making process geared toward coping with linear strategic dynamics, which are relatively easy to understand and predict (e.g., Porter, 1980) ; but at some times in their evolution they face nonlinear strategic dynamics that overwhelm their capacity for strategy-making. Nonlinearity is described as "the property that the magnitude of an effect or output is not linearly related to that of the cause or input" (Oxford English Dictionary, Supplement) . Such nonlinear transformations of inputs into outputs are governed by positive feedback loops in the interactions of the components of complex social systems (Arthur, 1989) , and their outcomes are difficult to understand and predict.
Nonlinear strategic dynamics come about as industry participants -sometimes incumbents, but probably more frequently new entrants -change the "rules of the game:" normative rules based on laws, customs, and administrative principles; technological rules based on available technical solutions; economic rules reflecting existing bargaining power relationships among the industry players (often captured in contracts); and cognitive rules that are widely shared judgments about key success factors (a kind of "industry recipe" (e.g., Spender, 1989) ). Whether implicit or explicit, the rules of the game usually remain unchallenged for extended periods of time (Grove, 2003) , thereby engendering a strong tendency toward strategic inertia among the industry incumbents.
Organizational ecology researchers have provided empirical evidence (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and deductive theoretical support (Hannan, Polos, and Carroll, 2004 ) of the value of inertia for organizational survival. They point to the conundrum leaders intending to improve organizational performance face, for instance through what they call "architectural change"(e.g., form of authority, pattern of control relations, and so on):
"Surely some architectural changes do improve performance and thereby reduce mortality hazards. Just as surely, others have the opposite effect. Should we assume the beneficial case as a default? We think not." (Hannan et al., 2004: 229) . Attempted changes are hazardous because the organization-specific contingencies on which the success depends are very difficult to assess a priori; many changes are imitative, simply reflecting fads and fashions; and changes often lead to unforeseen and unintended consequences (Hannan et al., 2004: 229-230) . Similarly, leading researchers of organizational learning and adaptation warn about the potential dangers of change associated with exploratory activities, because while the upside of correct decisions is very high, the downside of wrong ones can "…lead to major disasters…" (March, 2006: 205 ).
Yet, while organizational change may be potentially hazardous for corporate longevity,
equally dangerous is what we call the "creosote bush conundrum," using a metaphor coined by Craig Barrett, Intel Corporation's former Chief Executive Officer. The creosote bush is a desert plan that poisons the ground around it, preventing other plants from growing nearby. Accordingly, the creosote bush conundrum refers to the strategic inertia that a successful core business experiences as it gets locked-int its product-market environment. This makes it difficult to explore and exploit new business opportunities that are not directly related to it (Burgelman, 2002) . To the extent that corporate longevity depends on the capacity of a company to enter into and exit from businesses in the face of changing strategic dynamics (Burgelman, 1994) , this too is a serious conundrum of strategic leadership.
Nonlinear dynamics are systematically discussed in mathematical theories of complex adaptive systems in the physical and biological sciences (e.g., Prigogine, 1980; Kauffman, 1993; Gould, 2002) , and increasingly also in social science (e.g., Axelrod and Cohen, 2000) and history (e.g., Gaddis, 2002) . Management scholars have also attempted to introduce some of these theoretical ideas into administrative science (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; Thietart and Forgues, 1995; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Levinthal, 1997; McKelvey, 1997; Anderson, 1999; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002; Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell, 2005) . Discussing some of the original theorists' work Gould, however, cautions against "… any pure theoretician's claim that success in modeling logically entails reification in nature" (2002: 927) .
In this paper, we heed Gould's caution. Grounded in a combination of longitudinal field research and executive experience at Intel Corporation, we construct a conceptual framework of strategic dynamics situations and examine the various nonlinear ones that 6 the company has faced. Since the challenges posed by nonlinear strategic dynamics unavoidably need to be addressed by a company's strategy-making process, we examine the role of induced and autonomous strategy processes (Burgelman, 1991) , and associated developmental resource allocation that Intel has managed throughout its evolution.
We arrive at the same fundamental questions as posed in formal theories of complex adaptive systems: What is the balance of exploitation and exploration that will maximize a company's survival chances in the face of different nonlinear strategic dynamics situations? (March, 1991; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000) . How can a company's strategymaking process be designed to effectively maintain such balance so as to maximize both "fitness;" that is, adaptation to the current environment, and "evolvability;" that is, ability to adapt to a changing environment and/or to seek out new viable environments? (Kauffman, 1993; Gould, 2002) . We propose to show that different nonlinear strategic dynamics situations require different balances of induced and autonomous strategy processes, and that balanced cycles of these processes are at the heart of corporate longevity.
These important questions, in turn, raise another fundamental one about the role of strategic leadership: How can the importance of designing a strategy-making process capable of simultaneously maintaining fit and evolvability be reconciled with the observation that strategy does not play a decisive role in the evolution of companies that make it from "good to great" in the long run, but that what matters is a certain leadership style (Collins, 2001 )? Our single case study of Intel Corporation, described in more detail below, allows us to examine the role of strategy-making in great depth, and as a result we propose that strategic leadership -how top management designs the strategy-making process -is the means with which leadership style exerts its influence on corporate longevity.
Research method
Combining longitudinal field research and executive experience. We draw on longitudinal field research of Intel Corporation's evolution between 1968 and 2005 to highlight some of the strategic dynamics situations the company has faced and the role of its strategy-making process in managing them. Our research design for this paper is thus comparative with respect to time: We compare Intel's strategy-making approach in successive strategic dynamics situations over the course of its evolution. Our research design is also consistent with recommendations of scholars studying nonlinear change (Meyer, Gaba, and Colwell, 2005) : we situate Intel's evolution in the context of the highly dynamic industries in which it participates and focus on the periods when these were in flux, away from equilibrium, and discontinuous changes were taking hold.
The longitudinal field research has involved formal and informal interviews with many hundreds of Intel managers since 1988, the observation of strategic planning meetings, and the study of company documents (Burgelman, 1991; 1994; 2002a , 2002b . We augment relevant findings of this research with insights about managing Intel's strategic dynamics gained through more than thirty-five years of experience in top executive and governance positions at the company (Grove, 1996) . With the help of senior Intel finance staff, we also tried to reconstruct the developmental resource allocation related to induced and autonomous strategy processes throughout the company's evolution. While dollar amount allocation alone does not fully reflect resource deployment, it provides a first approximation of the corporation's efforts to cope with strategic dynamics.
Limitations. The usual caveats associated with case study research apply. Our combination of academic research and executive experience has provided a lens through which various strategic dynamics situations in Intel's evolution could be studied comprehensively and in unusual depth, but it unavoidably contains a subjective element.
Also, the personal computer industry is somewhat special because of the importance of increasing returns to adoption (Arthur, 1987) , which creates conditions leading to winnertake-all outcomes. Intel benefited from these conditions during part of its history. These limitations require caution about the extent to which our analysis can be generalized.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Strategic dynamics situations
We examine the various ways in which a focal company's strategic actions can interact with the environment. Call this focal company P i and the environment E, which includes the other players, P j , that constitute the traditional industry forces (customers, suppliers, competitors, complementors, potential new entrants, and substitutes), as well as exogenous forces such as technological change, government regulation and deregulation, and major fluctuations in the capital markets. While E's boundaries are relatively well defined at any given time, in a dynamic world other industries or newly emerging environmental segments may potentially affect E at some time. Call these other industries or emerging segments e, and consider (E, e) the relevant environment for our further discussion of strategic dynamics. Both P i and other players in (E, e) most of the time engage in rule-abiding strategic actions: Actions that are consistent with the prevalent normative, technological, economic, and cognitive rules that determine how P i and the other players in (E, e) compete and that have guided them toward achieving a relatively stable industry structure. Alternatively, they can seek to turn the basis of competition in the industry decisively to their advantage by engaging in rule-changing strategic actions.
Note that (E, e) are never identical across a set of P i comprising an industry; and, given that different P i have different positional and competence characteristics, it matters which P i tries to change the rules.
Game theorists note that relatively small changes in the rules can produce enormous changes in outcomes (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996) ; on the other hand, some rulechanging behavior, such as switching from Cournot (simultaneous) to Stackelberg (leader-follower) strategic action, can lead to quite stable equilibriums (e.g., Saloner, 1991: 126) . Organization theorists warn about unanticipated and unforeseen consequences (e.g., Hannan, Polos, and Carroll, 2004) . Complexity theory suggests that small changes in the interaction pattern of a large number of rule-abiding agents can have big effects (e.g., Gleick, 1987) . In light of these observations, the criterion we adopt for distinguishing rule-changing from rule-abiding strategic actions is that rule-changing actions by one of the players materially changes the competitive context for the other players and thereby the expected outcomes of their strategic actions (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000: 8; Gaddis, 2002: 97; Grove, 2003 Determining a priori whether a strategic action by P i (or one of the other players in (E, e)) is rule changing -e.g., negotiating a new type of contractual arrangement with customers or suppliers, introducing a technological innovation, successfully lobbying the government, and so on -will often not be possible. P i 's capacity for "strategic recognition" (Burgelman, 1983) of the rule-changing implications of a strategic action after it has been taken but before others see them seems critical. Such strategic recognition requires a mental state of constant alertness -metaphorically called "paranoia" (Grove, 1996) -widely distributed among P's leadership, which could be measured, for instance, by P i 's reaction time to changes in (E, e). she can just to stay in the same place (Barnett and Hansen, 1996) .
Sometimes players in (E, e) engage in rule-changing strategic actions that adversely impact P i . Such rule-changing strategic actions produce P-independent industry change, which significantly reduces P i 's power relative to (E, e). P-independent industry change is nonlinear and disruptive (from P i 's point of view): the rule-changing actions by players in (E, e) and P i 's inertial rule-abiding actions combine multiplicatively to materially and unfavorably change the context from P i 's perspective. This is likely to be reflected in P i 's decreasing relative share of the PIE. Our example of a competitor responding with rebates to another competitor's lower prices based on a new manufacturing strategy illustrates this situation (see above). In this case, P i is rule abiding in the face of rule changing by others in (E, e). Conversely, sometimes P i is able to engage in rule-changing strategic actions while the other players in (E, e) continue to engage in rule-abiding strategic action. P i 's successful rule-changing strategic actions produce P-controlled industry change, which significantly increases P i 's power relative to (E, e). P-controlled change is nonlinear and complex: P i 's rule-changing actions lead the other players in (E, e) to respond defensively, which multiplies their effect and materially changes the context to P i 's advantage. This is likely to be reflected in P's increasing relative share of the PIE.
Rule-changing strategic actions may be planned, but probably more often are unplanned and depend on strategic recognition of an opportunity that arises in a more or less fortuitous way. Forces driving toward commoditization, for instance, may change the rules (e.g., lead customers to expect lower price and higher quality) so that manufacturing process rather than product innovation becomes the new basis of competition (e.g., Utterback and Abernathy, 1975) ; or, a "disruptive technology" (Christensen and Bower, 1996) becomes "good enough" to change the basis of competition. In other cases, increasing returns to adoption (e.g., Arthur, 1989) , such as in the personal computer industry, and digitization of content, such as in the music industry, may make changing the rules possible. These sorts of technological developments, as well as some regulatory developments (e.g., the deregulation of the telecommunications industry), may engender P-independent industry change or make P-controlled industry change possible.
Sometimes both P i and other players in (E, e) engage in rule-changing strategic actions simultaneously. Such compounded rule-changing strategic actions lead to runaway industry change. Runaway industry change is nonlinear and can be characterized as chaotic. In contrast to complexity, "… chaos deals with situations such as turbulence (…) that rapidly become highly disordered and unmanageable…" (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000: xv) . Accordingly, the rule-changing strategic actions of players in (E, e) with P i' s rulechanging action interact multiplicatively and change the context in ways that are difficult to anticipate. While a runaway industry is the least stable situation and will eventually revert back to one of the other situations, it is difficult to predict which one. In the mean time, it is unclear whether P i 's rule-changing strategic actions will ultimately be to its advantage. Technological or regulatory forces driving the convergence or collision of different industry segments (e.g., Internet computing and desktop computing), or of entire industries (e.g., computing, communications, and consumer electronics), create conditions for runaway industry change.
Internal ecology of strategy making
The co-evolving interactions of P i and (E, e) constitute an ecological system (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1989 ). We propose that P i 's fate in this dynamic system depends, at least in part, on its own internal ecology of strategy making (Burgelman, 1991) .
Consequently, we view P i as an ecological system within which strategic initiatives emerge in patterned ways and compete for P i 's limited resources through two distinct processes. Through the induced strategy process P i exploits opportunities in its familiar environment. To do so, P i 's top management sets the corporate strategy and induces strategic actions by executives deeper in the organization that are aligned with it. The induced strategy process limits actions that deviate from the corporate strategy for at least two reasons. First, P i survived environmental selection by satisfying its customers and other constituencies in reliable ways and wants to continue to abide by the rules. This reactive propensity constitutes a rational source of strategic inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) . Second, P i successfully changes the rules and aligns all the forces at its disposition to reshape the environment to its advantage, but this proactive propensity results in co-evolutionary lock-in and becomes another rational source of strategic inertia (Burgelman, 2002a) .
Through the autonomous strategy process P i explores new opportunities that are outside the scope of the existing corporate strategy, relate to new environmental segments, and are often based, at least in part, on distinctive competencies that are new to the company.
Autonomous strategic initiatives usually, but not necessarily, originate at operational or middle management levels. They often come about fortuitously and somewhat unexpectedly as a result of P i 's dynamic capabilities (e.g., Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997 ) that co-evolve with (E, e). To overcome the selective effects of the company's structural context, which is set up to support initiatives that are aligned with the current corporate strategy (Bower, 1970) , the initiators of these autonomous initiatives try to activate a process -which we call strategic context determination (Burgelman, 1983) -to convince top management to amend P i 's corporate strategy, thereby integrating them into the induced process going forward. The key role of the autonomous process is to extend the boundaries of P i 's competencies and opportunities and/or to help P i prepare for disruptive technologies. On the other hand, resources can be spread thin if P supports too many autonomous initiatives (and halts too few), perhaps at the expense of its core businesses. Most dangerously, autonomous initiatives may undermine P i 's existing competitive position without providing a secure new one.
In general, the effectiveness of P i 's internal ecology of strategy making depends on maintaining P i 's ability to exploit existing opportunities through the induced process, while simultaneously maintaining P i 's ability to pursue new opportunities through the autonomous process.
MATCHING STRATEGY-MAKING AND STRATEGIC DYNAMICS: OBSERVATIONS FROM INTEL'S EVOLUTION
P-independent industry change: Intel's exit from DRAM
The entry into the dynamic random access memory (DRAM) industry of several large, vertically integrated Japanese companies, which were supported by the Japanese government in their quest for dominance of the DRAM industry, fundamentally changed the rules: As DRAM products became commoditized, customers demanded consistently high quality and low prices. Hence, it took manufacturing competence to win. Intel's competence, however, was circuit design and process technology. For several product generations Intel's inertial induced strategy process led the company to engage in strategic actions based on its existing distinctive competencies, which increasingly undermined its ability to compete in the changed DRAM industry.
Intel's induced strategy process became unhinged, with stated strategy and strategic action in the DRAM business diverging, as middle-level product planning managers gradually allocated scarce manufacturing capacity away from DRAM products to other, higher-margin products, including microprocessors. These actions were consistent with
Intel's generic strategy of differentiation and product leadership, which favored specialty products over commodities. But it exacerbated the decline of Intel's ability to compete in the DRAM industry. As a result of these external and internal forces, Intel's share of the DRAM PIE declined rapidly. Intel to take a significant share of the PIE. When Intel tried to change the arrangement, asking for compensation from second sources, these rivals declined. Rivals were ready to wait until the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) customers would browbeat Intel into giving the designs away. Consequently, Intel insisted on becoming sole source supplier to the OEMs. This strategic action was rule-changing because it fundamentally changed the balance of power between Intel, its OEM customers, and its competitors.
Fairly quickly this led to a major shift of influence toward Intel in terms of its ability to set industry-wide standards and to appropriate a rapidly increasing share of the PIE.
It worked because of the emergence of new patterns of behavior in the PC market segment associated with increasing returns to adoption and the "horizontalization" (Grove, 1993; Farrell, Monroe, and Saloner, 1998) of the computer industry. These new patterns favored Intel because of the strong product-market position it had achieved as a result of IBM's efforts to create a large installed base for its PC product in the emerging personal computer market segment, whose users demanded backward and forward compatibility (they wanted to be able to continue to use their application software). This motivated independent software developers to write new applications running on Intel microprocessors, creating thereby a fast growing ecosystem around the Intel Architecture.
The resulting "virtuous circle" -based on increasing returns to adoption (Arthur, 1989 In the late 1980s, Intel's official corporate strategy had been not to enter the RISC business, but rather to focus its induced strategy process on its x86 (CISC) architecture.
The sole-source strategy for the 386 processor was highly successful, and with the upcoming 486 microprocessor Intel was poised to further strengthen its position as the architectural leader in the early 1990s. Looking back, this was a confusing period for Intel. The i860 was a very successful renegade product that could have destroyed the virtuous circle enjoyed by the Intel Architecture. Intel was helping RISC by legitimizing it. Yet the company was dabbling, trying to be the best of the second best. A key lesson was that not all purported "paradigm shifts" are in fact paradigm shifts. Another key lesson concerned Intel's strategy-making process. Positively, it looked like a Darwinian process: Top management lets the best ideas win, adapts by ruthlessly exiting businesses, provides autonomy and is the referee who waits to see who wins and then re-articulates the strategy, and matches evolving skills with evolving opportunities. Negatively it looked like Intel is reactive, lacks focus and has no constancy of purpose. It looked like chaos -ready to reigned in.
And so it was.
Having concluded that RISC did not constitute a paradigm shift, top management determined to fully exploit Intel's favorable strategic position by vectoring everybody in the same direction through the induced strategy process. Intel's subsequent success with its highly focused strategy during 1991-97 then created "co-evolutionary lock-in" (Burgelman, 2002a) with the PC market segment. However, the associated strategic inertia then impeded the company's autonomous strategy process. As a result, when the PC market segment growth started to slow down by 1998, the company experienced difficulty in extending itself into new directions for continued profitable growth.
New P-controlled industry change: Intel's "right hand turn" It is important to note that the performance dimensions that the MPG sought were in conflict with those that had driven Intel's success in the past, particularly in the desktop market segment. One of the leaders of the group said: "Being located in Israel both helped and hurt the effort to convince the company to pursue mobility. The Israeli team has a 'renegade' culture, so we were very open to the idea of mobility in the first place.
However, being in Israel, far apart from Intel's HQ, made it difficult to convince the company to move toward mobility. It took blood, sweat and tears." He also said, however, that the effort was greatly helped by the fact that top Intel executives were concerned that the microprocessor was starting to use too much power, particularly in power-sensitive environments like mobile PCs, and that the CEO found the idea of a low power microprocessor very appealing (Burgelman and Meza, 2003) . 
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP OR LEADERSHIP STYLE -WHAT DID WE LEARN?
Our longitudinal study of Intel's evolution focused on turbulent periods in the company's history, when the existing equilibriums between it and its environment became undone, and strategic dynamics were nonlinear. Our framework of strategic dynamics (Figure 1) helped identify the challenges that different nonlinear dynamics situations pose for top management. We were able to link these to our framework of induced and autonomous processes, and our findings suggest that the most important contribution top management can make is to appropriately balance induced and autonomous strategy processes to meet the challenges of different strategic dynamics situations.
Accumulating resources
Our research also attempted to track Intel's developmental resource allocation to get an indication of how the company managed the balancing of induced and autonomous strategy processes throughout its evolution. We found that it was difficult to find information about conscious and formal decisions about developmental resource allocation to autonomous initiatives. This should perhaps not be surprising given that such initiatives, by definition, are not "planned." Based on the second author's executive experience and with the help of Intel's senior finance staff, however, we were able to roughly estimate the percentage of developmental resource allocation to induced and autonomous strategy processes at critical times in Intel's evolution. Table 1 shows these estimates.
_________________ Table 1 About Here _________________
We can see that most of the time a surprisingly large proportion of the company's developmental resources have been deployed in autonomous activities. It seems that companies naturally generate a "portfolio" of autonomous initiatives. Autonomous initiatives tend to emerge as middle managers search for opportunities to sustain their business in the face of internal and external selection pressures, and find resources that are not completely absorbed by the induced strategy process and use them for their initiative. For example, in the P-independent industry change situation, middle level managers allocated manufacturing capacity away from DRAM to microprocessors (even though the official corporate strategy was still focused on memory products); in the Pcontrolled industry change situation, the chipset business development was initially funded by the general manager of a division that was on the decline with cash generated from its very mature products; in the potential runaway industry change situation, the RISC team was able to get almost a third of the company's microprocessor development resources even though top management had not made a corporate-level strategic decision to pursue RISC; In a recent P-controlled industry change situation, Centrino grew out of a design team in Israel that faced disbanding, and the project was helped by the autonomous development, also in Israel, of a specialized chipset.
It is instructive to follow this development. What started as an autonomous initiative with
Centrino during the tenure of one CEO became the driving force of the induced strategy process -by the name "platformization" -under the next CEO in early 2005. With the autonomous initiative of the last several years having become the driving force of the new induced strategy process, a new cycle of autonomous initiatives emerged; for example an effort to develop digital products for health care applications, which by year end represented about 2 percent of development spending. Table 1 suggests that companies might be engaging in significantly more autonomous activity than is generally believed. This may surprise many management experts, who, as March (2006: 211) points out, tend to presume that the level of "exploration" is usually less than would be optimal. Yet, most of them don't contribute significantly to the longevity of the company. This has several important implications. Most likely it is far more difficult for strategic initiatives to be truly effectively induced by the corporate strategy than is generally understood. And, it poses distinct challenges related to resource allocation and top management control.
Scaling up and vectoring resources
In order to take advantage of the portfolio of autonomous initiatives we propose that it is necessary for top management to adopt an approach of experimentation-and-selection with novel ideas that initially require only small bets (e.g., Burgelman, 1983; March, 1991 March, , 2006 . Such an approach implies that middle mangers must be able to engage in autonomous initiatives before they actually have formally obtained resources to do so.
However, since autonomous initiatives start small they need to scale-up in order to be relevant from the corporate strategy point of view. Scaling up depends on the capacity of middle-level executives to build on the initial success of an initiative by combining it with other autonomous initiatives from different parts of the company (often existing there as "orphan" projects), and/or with relatively small acquisitions. Such activities require "strategic context determination," which, however, is beyond the purview of middle management. It is top management, who must evaluate how these initiatives fit into, or reshape or even radically change, the corporate strategy going forward.
We also propose that as an autonomous initiative gains impetus in the strategy-making process, a critical top management strategic role is to evaluate first, the extent to which the autonomous opportunity has been validated (through the process of strategic context determination), and second, the extent to which available cash reserves are sufficient to protect the company from disaster in case the scaled-up autonomous initiative ultimately fails. This suggests four possible strategic choices: (1) "safe bet:" validated opportunity and sufficient cash reserves; (2) "bet the company:" validated opportunity but insufficient reserves; (3) "wait to bet:" not-yet-validated opportunity and sufficient cash reserves; and (4) "desperate bet:" not-yet-validated opportunity and insufficient cash reserves. Figure 2 shows the four strategic choices. 
________________
Strategically balancing induced and autonomous processes
Based on our analysis of Intel's evolution, we propose that different strategic dynamics situations call for different balances of induced and autonomous strategy processes. In the base case of limited industry change, P i must continue to exploit the opportunities associated with the current corporate strategy, which is achieved through the induced strategy process. P i 's sustained profitable growth, however, depends on being able to continue to develop new business opportunities to replace declining ones over time, which requires an active portfolio of autonomous initiatives and a commensurate degree of accessible uncommitted resources and looseness of managerial control. Hence, top management should watch evolving growth opportunities and marginally re-balance resource allocation to the induced and autonomous processes.
In the case of P-independent industry change, the autonomous strategy process becomes key. As other players are able to engage in rule-changing strategic action, P i' s induced process does not readily respond to these changes because of strategic inertia. But even if P i could adapt to the changing basis of competition it is unlikely that it would be better than an also-ran. Ultimately, P i is better off pursuing new opportunities created by the autonomous strategy process that continue to capitalize on the company's distinctive competencies. Hence, top management should significantly increase resource allocation to the autonomous strategy process to generate a higher rate of new initiatives in the portfolio, and gradually increase resource allocation to winning initiatives before existing opportunities in the induced process wither away.
In the case of P-controlled industry change the induced process becomes key. While opportunities for P i 's potential rule-breaking strategic actions often can be traced back to initiatives that started in the autonomous strategy process, P-controlled change requires that P i align the internal and external forces to its advantage and massively increases resource allocation to the induced strategy process. As a result, however, successful Pcontrolled change may make it difficult to pay attention to future new business opportunities. Hence, top management should continue to allocate a minimum amount of resources to keep the autonomous process viable and maintain at least a limited portfolio of autonomous initiatives.
The extreme uncertainty of runaway industry change creates a resource allocation conundrum because P i cannot support both processes at increased levels simultaneously.
Top management must decide between two different courses of action with respect to the balance of induced and autonomous processes. If P i already has a validated new opportunity to make a "safe bet" or "bet the company," the induced strategy process is key to impose a new strategic direction. If P i does not yet have a validated new opportunity and decides to "wait to bet," the autonomous strategy process is key for discovering a viable new strategic direction. 
EXPRESSION OF LEADERSHIP STYLE
Collins (2001) defined great companies as those 11 that for a period of 15 years after a major transition were able to achieve average cumulative stock returns at least 3 times those of the overall stock market. 3 He and his research team found that such enduring greatness depended on "level 5" leadership style: "a paradoxical blend of personal humility and professional will." Such leaders "get the right people on the bus before they figure out the best path to greatness;" are willing to "confront the brutal facts without losing faith;" pursue a fairly simple core business in which they can be the best in the world, feel passionate about, and get tremendous profits on a carefully chosen denominator (the "hedgehog concept"); develop a culture that combines discipline with entrepreneurship; and pioneer the use of carefully selected technologies to accelerate their profitable growth. Rather than the result of dramatic transformations, the process that generates greatness is metaphorically described as "…relentlessly pushing a giant heavy flywheel in one direction… " (2001: 14) .
While academic researchers have pointed at potential weaknesses in Collins's methodology, for instance, the fact that "long leads in random walks" may produce sustained interfirm performance differences based on chance only (Denrell, 2004) , this is not our concern here. 4 We do, however, note that Collin's large sample study, while thorough and capably carried out, did not examine the role of balancing cycles of induced and autonomous processes in the long-lived success of the companies studied, and thus may have missed a deeper and primal reinforcing relationship between leadership and strategy-making process.
The strategic management field has long been interested in developing a truly dynamic theory that explains how superior competitive positions are attained longitudinally (Porter, 1991 Alert strategic leadership is cognizant of the important role of both induced and autonomous processes in strategy-making, tolerates a sufficient level of uncommitted resources and looseness in control to continue to maintain a portfolio of autonomous initiatives, and is able to select at the right time those that need to be converted to the discipline of the induced process in order to cope with nonlinear strategic dynamics. We think that our framework of different strategic dynamics situations may help top management to better identify the associated challenges and match the dynamics of the internal machinery of strategy making -characterized by the balance of induced and autonomous strategy processes -with the dynamics of the external ecology in which the company operates. Our fundamental proposition is that corporate longevity depends on the coincidence, at different key moments in a company's evolution, of such alert strategic leadership and the complex, on-going cycles of induced and autonomous processes that renew the organization and keep it viable.
Our confidence in this fundamental proposition is bolstered by the fact that it parallels insights from formal theories of complex adaptive systems. Prigogine (1980: 128) , for instance, observes that the continued evolution of complex adaptive systems depends on "mutations" and "innovations" occurring stochastically (in our terms: generated through the autonomous process) and becoming integrated into the system by the "deterministic relations prevailing at the moment" (in our terms: becoming part of the induced process).
Similarly, it parallels the idea of "adaptation at the edge of chaos," (Kauffman, 1993) which suggests, in Gould's succinct translation "… that a system must be adaptive, but that too much (and too precise) a local fitting may freeze a system in transient optimality with insufficient capacity for future change. Too much chaos may prove fatal by excessive and unpredictable fluctuation, both in external environments and internal states.
(…) Adaptation at the edge of chaos balances both desiderata of current functionality and potential for future change, or evolvability." (2002: 1273-74 ).
Achieving such a balance by design as compared to evolution is difficult and requires the juggling of opposing tendencies. Lining up potentially diverging strategies and keeping them lined up through the induced strategy process is itself a demanding task. Yet, as we have seen in the Intel case, the company must also prepare itself for the next big opportunity by continuing to let middle management experiment with, and then select, new strategic initiatives through the autonomous process before converting them to the discipline of the induced process. The appropriate balance of induced and autonomous strategy processes at different times in a company's evolution may be thought of in terms of linear combinations of the two processes, with varying weights on each of them over time, but with none of the weights ever becoming zero. Finding the right weights for each time period is the supreme challenge of top management. The process of changing these weights can be characterized by the exhortation that during times of nonlinear change, management should let chaos reign, then rein in chaos --but, as we have learned, never quite completely. 
